V. The Exception Clauses Are Dispensationally Limited In Light
Of Their Specific And Immediate Hermeneutical Context
In their weakness, shortsightedness and rebellion, people grasp
at what seems to be one loophole in the Lord's instructions regarding
marriage and divorce. They only wish to have their own selfish
way, and yet they look for a passage of Scripture, totally misinterpret
it when they find it, and thus seek to quiet their own consciences.
Some seek an interpretation of the Bible which will agree with
their own thinking. What they actually seek is permission for
divorce. They then look essentially to Moses' Law or Christ's
endorsement of it for that permission. When a person acts in this
manner, he plainly evidences the hardness of his heart (a sin!).
But Moses allowed or regulated divorce only because of the hardness
of the hearts of the people in Israel. Many people think, however,
that just because Christ restated and explained the Mosaic concept
that He thereby endorsed the Mosaic teaching as being a permanent
principle. This is simply not the case.
At this point, several important statements concerning Bible interpretation
must be made. When the twentieth-century interpreter approaches
Jesus' divorce sayings, and especially the ones in Matthew, he
lacks a significant variable which was readily available
to the disciples of the first century: a contextual grid within
which Jesus spoke His words and through which His listeners perceived
them. A true and faithful Bible student will search the Scriptures
to find the fundamental principle of any given doctrine. He should
use all the valid hermeneutical principles at his disposal which
are taught by the Scriptures. Two of those principles which have
some bearing on the current discussion are the "law of first
mention" and the "law of last mention." In general,
the last part of the revelation of a truth supersedes in its application
the former parts which belong to and have their
application in another dispensation. The truth of this assertion
may be seen, for example, in regard to the eating of meats. When
the "rule of last mention" is applied in learning God's
mind on the matter of divorce, one must look to I Corinthians
7 for help in understanding the less clear passages of Matthew
5 and Matthew 19. In applying these principles to marriage and
divorce one finds that there are fundamental prohibitions regarding
divorce against which or in the light of which the exception clauses
must be examined. Should one not expect that Jesus, the Son of
God, would command and desire His disciples to reflect the loyal
love of covenant faithfulness that God required of Hosea when
his unfaithful wife Gomer persisted in her adultery and immorality?
If Genesis 2:24 presents God's commanded ideal for marriage, then
Hosea illustrates obedience to God's ideal. Furthermore, it is
virtually impossible to interpret Jesus' teaching in Matthew 19:4-8
as anything but an absolute prohibition of divorce. These considerations
make it very likely that Jesus, by means of the Mosaic and legally
precise exception clauses, is not adopting His culture's mores
respecting the acceptability of putting away a wife. Also, Jesus
is not giving a ground for divorce as though it were available
to the believer in the post-Law era. Furthermore, in the event
of adultery, Jesus would surely require the unlimited forgiveness
of seventy times seven (Matthew 18:21-35) exhibited by Hosea with
the ultimate goal of restoration and reconciliation.
If there are difficulties or seeming contradictions, the less
clear passages must be interpreted in light of the clearer ones.
For example, the much debated Matthew 5 and Matthew 19 passages
should be examined in light of Genesis 2 and especially I Corinthians
7. This method has not been followed by many Bible students when
it comes to the question of divorce referred to in the exception
clauses of Matthew 5 and Matthew 19. "It will be readily
granted that the apostle Paul, in his care for and dealings with
the churches, must have had many occasions for making use of the
teaching found in Matthew 5:32 and Matthew 19:9. This is all the
more true if these verses mean what so many Christian teachers
today imply that they mean, namely, that a Christian has the right
to divorce on the ground of adultery. Yet, never once are they
so used, nor referred to in the epistles. Why did Paul not base
his teaching on the Lord's words of Matthew 5:32 and Matthew 19:9,
verses wherein it is plainly stated that a husband was at liberty
to put away his wife for the one cause of fornication? Are we
to assume he was ignorant of what Christ said in these passages?
Or shall we attribute it to divine design on the part of the Holy
Spirit of God? We believe the omission is divinely purposed. It
is yet another strong link in the chain of evidence proving that
these two utterances in Matthew are nothing more than a restatement
and true interpretation of the Mosaic statute of divorce. This
statute was applicable at the time the Lord spoke these exception
clauses to men under the Law. Thus, the exception clauses were
applicable only to those under the Law. Accredited interpreters
of the Scriptures follow a standard rule in their exegesis of
God's Word. They employ the law of never using a doubtful passage
to contradict a clear positive one. Let the reader put the words
from I Corinthians 7:10-11 over against the words of Matthew 19:9
and he will find the one is at variance with the other. The Matthew
passage permits divorce (for one cause -- fornication) whereas
the Corinthian one prohibits it. Such variations in doctrine can
be explained on the ground that, in context, each of these teachings
belongs to a different dispensation. The Matthew passage belongs
to that of
explaining the Law, while the letter to the church at Corinth
belongs to the Christian dispensation."
This fundamental distinction has often been overlooked in regard
to the correct understanding, interpretation, and application
of these exception clauses. In consequence, much confusion, misinterpretation,
and misapplication has become evident in the churches today.
Some interpreters assume that the "fuller" statements
of Matthew (the exception clauses) must be "inserted"
in the Mark and Luke accounts on the basis that the "lesser
assumes the fuller." One is told that Mark and Luke give
the "general" law of marriage and Matthew's "fuller"
account gives an exception to it. This author finds the modern
interpretation (which assumes the correctness of the above mentioned
principle in Matthew/Mark) to be difficult to swallow in reconciling
the Marcan and Lukan accounts. The principle that God has "general"
laws which allow for "exceptions" to His commanded will
is highly suspect based on God's character and revelation of Himself
in Scripture. Though this general principle versus specific instance
type of hermeneutic may have application somewhere, it is out
of place in dealing with the Matthew 5 and Matthew 19 passages
as compared to Mark's writings. The modern view of the exception
clauses (following Erasmus, the Westminster Confession, and John
Murray) is diametrically opposed to the clear teaching of Mark,
Luke and Paul.
"In response to those interpreters who believe that Matthew
may contain the clearer teaching, and that Mark and Luke condensed
his account, we are not overly troubled by a condensed report.
However, a contradictory report, no matter how full or condensed,
is a problem. Again, we believe that the problem does not arise
with the clear teaching of Mark, Luke or Paul, but with the interpreter
who imposes his view of the exception clause on the rest of the
New Testament teaching."
The fact that these are four distinct utterances (explained elsewhere
in this thesis) mitigates against the consideration that Mark
and Luke merely condensed Jesus' teaching as recorded by Matthew.
Yet modern interpreters interpret the rest of the New Testament
teaching on divorce (the clear passages) by the unique phrases
in Matthew 5 and Matthew 19 (the less clear passages). This method
is self-defeating and frustrative. It leads to the kind of contradictory
reports that it was trying to avoid in the first place.
According to Matthew, the Pharisees essentially asked Jesus if
it was lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause at all.
In Mark (the fourth utterance) the question is really about the
actual legitimacy of divorce for post-Law disciples. Matthew's
account makes the issue more specific. Jesus is asked for His
opinion on one of the big moral issues of the day: how should
Deuteronomy's law of divorce be interpreted. The Pharisees who
followed Shammai held that divorce was only legitimate for serious
sexual offenses (or one offense -- adultery). The more liberal
followers of Hillel argued that any misdemeanor was grounds for
divorce. But Jesus rejects both positions. Neither the conservative
Shammaites nor the liberal Hillelites were right in their understanding
of the Mosaic permission for divorce. Jesus restores to force
God's commanded will for the post-Law age. Like modern scholars,
the Pharisees see these remarks as an apparent rejection of even
Moses' permission for divorce, and so they shift their line of
attack by immediately quoting the provision of Deuteronomy 24
(Matthew 19:7). Nevertheless, Jesus stands by His position. Divorce
was a concession introduced by Moses (for Israel under the Law)
because of Israel's obdurate sinfulness and hardness of heart.
Otherwise, divorce is sin. God did not intend to allow it when
He created man. One may also compare this with the contemporary
understanding of Matthew 5:32 in the context of the Sermon on
the Mount whose controlling thought is found in verse 48. If the
modern interpretation of verse 32 is accepted, Jesus is, in fact,
giving a teaching that is no higher than Shammai's. He is not
upholding the commanded ideal (of Matthew 5:48) but would merely
be teaching the standard recognized by the Jews of His day. Yet
modern-day defenders of the Erasmian view (Murray and others)
somehow believe that Jesus' grounds for divorce in Matthew 19:9
were somehow more restricted than Shammai's (and thus far more
difficult to accept). If this is correct, then their argument
would have to be modified somehow to say that Jesus did eventually
go beyond both rabbinical schools of thought. But Matthew's exception,
on the Erasmian understanding, is still contextually incongruent
with Jesus' absolute prohibition of both divorce and remarriage
in Matthew 19:4-8.
William Heth, in quoting David Catchpole, brings out the flavor
of the debate quite precisely:
"What Moses commanded [allowed], the historical Jesus rejects
[at least in terms of permanent, post-Mosaic Law principle]. In
Mark 10:2-9 Jesus makes a decision about divorce, in effect [and
in contrast to Matthew's exception clauses], a decision about
Moses. Nothing should blunt the sharp edge of His words. He diverges
from all tradition, whether of Hillelite liberals or of Shammaite
conservatives. Paradoxically, by taking a position more conservative
than that of the conservative Shammaites, He takes a position
more radical than all. This passage [Mark 10:2-12] is an abrogation
of the Law, an openly declared criticism [setting aside for the
post-Law Christian] of the Law of Moses. It [Mark 10:2-12] is
not an accentuation of the Torah, but an annulling of it. Christ's
absolute prohibition of divorce and the exceptions recorded by
Matthew point to the obvious context of Jewish marriage customs
in which Jesus' debate with the Pharisees transpired."
